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Abstract
We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-
good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of
an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specic invest-
ments at private cost. As in property-rights models, di¤erent governance structures
induce di¤erent investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may
invest in acquiring (common-value) information, which is then incorporated into the
market-clearing price by the partiestrading behaviors. The informativeness of the
price mechanism a¤ects the returns to specic investments and hence the optimal gov-
ernance structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the governance-structure choices by
individual dyads a¤ect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium,
rms and the market coexist and shape each other. In particular, the informativeness
of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogenous dyads to choose heterogeneous
governance structures. (JEL D20, D23)
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1 Introduction
Since Coase (1937), economists have sought to understand why rms exist, given the power
of the price mechanism as an informing and coordinating device. As Coase argued, it is
surely important to enquire why co-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one
case and of the entrepreneur in the other(p. 359, emphasis added).
Signicant progress has been made in answering this question, including contributions
by Williamson (1971, 1975, 1979), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and others. But rms and markets have typically been seen
as alternative ways of coordinating economic activity, rather than as two institutions that
coexist and shape each other. That is, scant attention has been paid to the interaction
between D. H. Robertsons islands of conscious power and the ocean of unconscious
cooperationin which he envisioned such islands coagulating like lumps of butter in a pail
of buttermilk(1928: 85).
In this paper we explore how the informativeness of the price mechanism and rms
integration decisions interact. To explore how these two institutions shape each other, our
model incorporates two, reciprocal considerations. First, rms operate in the context of the
market: the informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects the relative returns to parties
specic investments and hence partiesoptimal choices of governance structures. Second, a
market (for an intermediate good) is made up of rms: the partiesgovernance structures
a¤ect how they buy and sell in the intermediate-good market and hence the informativeness
of the price mechanism. In equilibrium, these reciprocal considerations must both be taken
into account.
The economic environment we analyze includes uncertainty. Formally, the uncertainty
concerns consumersvaluation of nal goods, but we discuss several other interpretations
below. Parties can resolve this uncertainty at a cost. As in other rational-expectations
models, the price mechanism both clears the market and conveys information from informed
to uninformed parties. The fact that the price is not perfectly informative provides the
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requisite incentive for some parties to pay the cost to resolve the uncertainty.
As one specic example, consider a U.S. steel producer deciding how much steel to pro-
duce. Demand for steel might depend on future construction in China, which is uncertain.
Travelling to China and conducting interviews could give a steel producer a better signal of
Chinese construction and hence demand, allowing better decisions about plants, equipment
and materials for steel production. But other steel producers, who choose not to conduct
such research, could look at the market price for an upstream good (such as iron ore) and
infer some of the information gathered by the rms that did conduct research. This example
parallels our model, in that it is the market-clearing price of an intermediate good (iron ore)
that conveys information about the uncertain value of the nal good (steel).
Many other interpretations of our model arise if we consider alternative sources of un-
certainty, other than the value of goods such as steel. For example, the uncertainty might
concern whether tari¤barriers will change or whether a new technology will fulll its promise.
As in our example, this uncertainty could apply to activities that are upstream or downstream
from the intermediate-good market for which we analyze rational-expectations pricing. In-
terestingly, however, not all sources of uncertainty will do: our rational-expectations model
applies to common- rather than private-value uncertainty. An analogous distinction arises
in auction theory, where the winners curse (i.e., updating about other bidderssignals if
your bid wins the auction) arises only under common- rather than private-value uncertainty.
A similar logic holds here. As Grossman (1981: 555) puts it, in non-stochastic (and cer-
tain stochastic) economies, No one tries to learn anything from prices [because] there is
nothing for any individual to learn(as may be the case under private-value uncertainty).
Often, however, there is something to learn from pricessuch as when there is common-value
uncertainty.
Our emphasis on the interaction between the informativeness of the price mechanism
and rmsintegration decisions seems new. That is, while Coase was explicit that the price
mechanism is the chief alternative to internal organization, and Williamsons (1975) title
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famously emphasized Marketsas the alternative to hierarchy, over the next 35 years, the
market disappeared from the literature on rmsboundaries. Instead, the literature focused
on non-integration versus integration, with the discussion of non-integration emphasizing
hold-up costs rather than the markets price mechanism. In fact, even Williamsons early
work (1971: 114) adopted this approach, suggesting that at is frequently . . . more e¢ cient
[than] haggling,thereby emphasizing the haggling of non-integration rather than the price
mechanism of the market. Similarly, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978: 298) emphasize
hold-up by arguing that as assets become more specic and more appropriable quasi-rents
are created . . . , we are more likely to observe vertical integration. Likewise, Grossman
and Hart (1986: 590) began by asking What is a rm? and developed an important
answer involving residual rights of control but again ignored the price mechanism, instead
emphasizing hold-up as the consequence of divided control.
The ensuing literatures on transaction costs and property rights have greatly enhanced
our understandings of the costs and benets of integration. Furthermore, both of these
approaches have been fruitfully applied in many other elds of economics.1 But the literature
on rms boundaries, with its focus on the consequences of divided control rather than
on the price mechanism, has become completely divorced from both Coases (1937: 359)
original framing and the Marketsaspect of Williamsons (1975) apt title. In this paper,
therefore, we bring the informativeness of the price mechanism back into the theory of rms
boundaries.2
1For surveys, see Hart (1995) and Macher & Richman (2008). Many make-or-buy questions have been
analyzed in these terms, for example: internal versus external capital markets (Gertner et al. (1994)), in-
house versus outsourced research and development (Aghion & Tirole (1994)), real versus formal authority
(Aghion & Tirole (1997)), public versus private provision of services (Hart et al. (1997)), macroeconomic
issues (Caballero & Hammour (1998)), intra- versus inter-rm international trade (Antràs (2003)), and more.
2Grossman & Helpman (2002), Legros & Newman (2008a), Legros & Newman (2008b) and Legros &
Newman (2009) analyze other interactions between rmsintegration decisions and the market, but they focus
on interactions that do not involve the informativeness of the price mechanism. In these models, supply and
demand determine prices, which in turn determine the returns to the partiesactions and hence the parties
optimal governance structures; meanwhile, the partiesactions in turn determine supply and demand, so
governance and pricing interact. As Grossman (1981: 555) notes, such Walrasian equilibria are not useful
as a tool for thinking about how goods are allocated... when...information about the future...a¤ects current
prices.
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In the spirit of Hayek (1945), we view the market as informing and coordinating through
the price mechanism. We therefore develop a rational-expectations model similar to Gross-
man and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) but designed to apply to goods markets (as opposed to -
nancial markets), with (a) positive prices and quantities and (b) persistent participants (as
opposed to transitory noise traders). In Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (2009; hereafter GHP),
we develop such a rational-expectations model for a goods market, but for the Grossman-
Stiglitz case of individual investors. Relative to rational-expectations pricing models such
as Grossman-Stiglitz (and GHP), the novel component in this paper is the analysis of alter-
native governance structures. Specically, we enrich GHP to allow for production by dyads
(with two feasible governance structures, depending on which party owns an alienable asset)
rather than only individual investors.
To model these dyads, we develop a simplied version of the classic property-rights theory
(PRT) initiated by Grossman and Hart. To keep things simple, our property-rights model
involves two parties and a single alienable asset. Regardless of who owns the asset, each
party can make a specic investment, but the returns to these investments depend on who
owns the asset. Following the PRT (i.e., analyzing one dyad in isolation) reveals that the
optimal ownership structure is determined by the marginal returns to these investments.
In our model all dyads are homogeneous ex ante, so a PRT analysis of a single dyad would
prescribe that all dyads choose the same ownership structure. Relative to the PRT, the novel
component of our model is the inclusion of the informativeness of the price mechanism, which
endogenizes the returns to the partiesspecic investments and hence creates an industry-
level determinant of an individual dyads choice of governance structure.
In summary, our model integrates two familiar approaches: rational expectations (where
an imperfectly informative price mechanism both permits rational inferences by some parties
and induces costly information acquisition by others) and property rights (where equilibrium
investments depend on the partiesgovernance structure and asset ownership is chosen to
induce second-best investments). Our main result is that, even though all dyads are homo-
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geneous ex ante (and thus would choose the same governance structure in a PRT analysis),
in the presence of common-value uncertainty, the informativeness of the price mechanism
yields an industry equilibrium that often involves identical dyads choosing di¤erent gover-
nance structures. To explain this result, we describe the model in more detail (for the
interpretation where the uncertainty concerns the value of nal goods, as in our steel exam-
ple).
In each dyad the two parties are upstream and downstream in a production process that
can transform an intermediate good (a widget) into a nal good. Upstream parties may
be endowed with a widget. Upstream parties that are endowed with a widget can sell it in
the widget market, and any party may purchase a widget from the market. The alienable
asset is a machine that can transform one widget into one nal good (at a cost). Upstream
parties may make investments that reduce the cost of operating the machine; we therefore
think of upstream parties as having human capital that is relevant to the production of nal
goods. Downstream parties may make investments that deliver information about the value
of a nal good in the consumer market; we therefore think of downstream parties as having
human capital that is relevant to the marketing of nal goods.
As in the PRT, the partiesincentives to make investments depend on asset ownership.
In particular, in our model, only the party that owns the machine has an incentive to invest.
Thus, in dyads where the downstream party owns the machine, the downstream party invests
in information about the value of the nal good, whereas in dyads where the upstream party
owns the machine, the upstream party invests instead in cost reduction and relies solely on
the price mechanism for information about the value of the nal good. Naturally, if the price
mechanism is more informative, the returns to investing in information are lower so dyads
have a greater incentive to choose upstream ownership and invest instead in cost reduction.
As in rational-expectations models, however, when fewer parties invest in information, the
price mechanism becomes less informative, thereby making downstream ownership more
attractive. An industry equilibrium must balance these two forces. We show that a
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unique equilibrium exists and is often interior. In this sense, the price mechanism induces
heterogenous behavior among homogeneous dyads.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we specify and discuss the
model. Section 3 analyzes the integration decision of a single dyad in isolation, and Section
4 analyzes the informativeness of the price mechanism, taking rmsgovernance structure
choices as given. Section 5 then combines the property-rights and rational-expectations as-
pects of the previous two sections, analyzing the equilibrium choices of governance structures
for all the dyads in the industry and hence deriving our main result. Section 6 discusses
some implications of the model and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Statement of the Problem
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral dyads that are exogenously matched to each other. Each
dyad i 2 [0; 1] consists of two parties, denoted Ui and Di; and a machine that is capable
of developing one intermediate good (a widget) into one nal good at cost ci  U [c; c] :
The machine can be owned by either party, but it is relationship-specic (i.e., the machine is
useless outside its intended dyad). If party Ui owns the machine, we say that the governance
structure in dyad i is gi = U; whereas if party Di owns the machine, we say that gi = D:
Final goods have an uncertain value. Party Di can invest at private cost KD to learn
the value of a nal good in the market, v  U [v; v] : If Di incurs this cost, Ui knows that
Di is informed but does not herself observe v: Party Ui can invest at cost KU in reducing
the cost of operating the dyads machine. If she incurs this cost, both parties observe that
ci is reduced to ci  , where   c:
We embed these dyads in our rational-expectations model of price formation in goods
markets from GHP. A fraction y  1 of the dyads is endowed with a widget. In particular,
Ui is endowed with wi = 1 widget if i  y and wi = 0 widgets if i > y; where y is taken to
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be an exogenous (and commonly known) aggregate endowment. Parties not endowed with
a widget may purchase one in the widget market, and those who are endowed with one may
sell it into the market. Additionally, there is a set of rms outside this industry of uncertain
mass z; each of whom demands one widget inelastically at any price p  v: We think of
this demand as coming from a nearby industry that has an alternative use for widgets.
Assume z  U [z; z] ; and dene x = y   z  U [x; x] to be the net endowment of widgets in
the industry we analyze (where x = y   z and x = y   z are such that [x; x]  [0; 1]).
Equilibrium in the market for widgets occurs at the price p that equates supply and
demand (from informed, uninformed, and outside parties). In making supply or demand
decisions for widgets, parties that are not directly informed about v make rational inferences
about v from the market price for widgets. Dyads choose their governance structures (i.e.,
machine ownership) taking into account the information that will be inferred from the market
price and hence the relative returns from the two partiesinvestments.
2.2 Timing and Assumptions
We now state the timing and assumptions of the model more precisely. We comment on
these assumptions in Section 2.3. There are seven periods.
Figure 1: Timeline
In the rst period, industry-level uncertainty is resolved: the value of a nal good v is
drawn from U [v; v] and the outside demand z is drawn from U [z; z] ; but neither of these
variables is observed by any parties.
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In the second period, each dyad negotiates a governance structure gi 2 fU;Dg: under
gi = U; party Ui owns the machine that can develop one widget into one nal good; under gi =
D; party Di owns this machine. This negotiation of governance structure occurs via Nash
bargaining. To simplify notation, we assume that dyads do not know their indices at this
point and hence cannot condition their governance-structure choices on their endowments.
In the third period, parties Ui andDi simultaneously choose whether to make relationship
specic investments (or not) at costsKU andKD; respectively. In partial accordance with the
PRT, we assume that the acts of making these investments are observable but not veriable,
but we depart from the PRT (in a manner that is natural in our setting) by assuming that
the outcome of the downstream partys investment (namely, learning v) is observable to only
Di; not Ui:
In the fourth period, each dyad learns its index, i; and all Ui with i  y are endowed
with wi = 1 widget.
In the fth period, price formation takes place, in three steps. In period 5a, the parties
Ui and Di commonly observe ci  U [c; c], the raw cost of running their machine, as well as
i 2 f0;g, the amount of cost reduction achieved by Uis specic investment. Also, Di (but
not Ui) observes 'i 2 f;; vg ; a signal about the value v of the nal good, where 'i = ; is the
uninformative signal that obtains if party Di has not invested KD in period 3, and 'i = v is
the perfectly informative signal received if KD has been invested. It is useful to introduce
the following notation for the parties information sets: sDi = (ci; i; 'i) ; s
U
i = (ci; i; ;) ;
and si =
 
sDi ; s
U
i

: Then, in period 5b, a mass z of outside parties each demands a single
widget at any price p  v: Finally, in period 5c, the market for widgets clears at price p:
In particular, any party may buy a widget, and any upstream party endowed with a widget
may sell it (inside or outside the dyad). There are thus eight possible outcomes when the
market closes, depending on whether upstream has a widget, downstream has a widget, and
who owns the machine. As the analysis in Section 4 shows, however, the only relevant issue
is whether the machine owner has a widget.
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In the sixth period, production occurs: if the machine owner in dyad i has a widget, then
he or she can run the machine to develop the widget into a nal good at cost ci   i. We
denote the decision to produce a nal good by qi = 1 and the decision not to do so by qi = 0:
O¤ the equilibrium path, one party might own the machine and the other a widget, in which
case the parties bargain over the widget and then the machine owner makes the production
decision.
Finally, in the seventh period, nal goods sell for v and payo¤s are realized. The expected
payo¤s (before v is realized) are
giUi = pwi + 1fgi=Ug1fqi=1g

E

vjsUi ; p (; ) = p
  p  (ci   i) ; and
giDi = 1fgi=Dg1fqi=1g

E

vjsDi ; p (; ) = p
  p  (ci   i) :
2.3 Discussion of the Model
Before proceeding with the analysis, we pause to comment on some of the modeling choices
we have made.
First, we assume that the machine is dyad-specic. This assumption allows us to focus
on the market for widgets by eliminating the market for machines. By allowing both markets
to operate, one could analyze whether the informativeness of one a¤ects the other.
Second, we have only one alienable asset, in contrast to the classic PRT setting. Our
choice here is driven purely by parsimony; extending the model to allow more alienable assets
(and hence more governance structures) could be interesting.
Third, we have binary investments in cost reduction and information acquisition (at
costs KU and KD; respectively), rather than continuous investment opportunities. It seems
straightforward to allow the probability of success (in cost reduction or information acquisi-
tion) to be an increasing function of the investment level, which in turn has convex cost.
Fourth, we assume that the exogenous aggregate endowment y is known and whether
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an individual dyad receives a widget is not revealed until period 4. The exogeneity of y
eliminates inferences about aggregate endowments based on individual endowments. Re-
vealing individual endowments in period 4 eliminates conditioning the choices of governance
structure or specic investments on the dyads endowment. The latter is not a substantive
assumption (since wi enters additively everywhere), but we make it for notational simplicity.
Fifth, as in GHP, we assume inelastic demand z from an outside industry at any price
p  v: This uncertain demand plays the role of noise traders, making the market price for
widgets only partially informative about v; so that parties may benet from costly acquisition
of information about v:
Sixth, again as in GHP, our assumptions that all the random variables are uniform allow
us to compute a closed-form (indeed, piece-wise linear) solution for the equilibrium price
function at the industry level. This tractability is very useful in the computing the returns
to alternative governance structures, at the dyad level.
Seventh, as in Grossman-Stiglitz and the ensuing rational-expectations literature, our
model of price formation is not an extensive-form model of strategic decision-making (includ-
ing information transmission during the price-formation process), but rather a reduced-form
model of price-taking behavior. See GHP for an extended discussion.
3 Individual Dyad Behavior
As a building block for our ultimate analysis, we rst analyze the behavior of a single dyad
taking the market price p as given. To begin, dene the expected gross surplus (at the start
of period seven) for dyad i as
GSi + pwi = 
gi
Ui
+ giDi
= pwi + 1fqi=1g [E [vjsgii ; p (; ) = p]  p  (ci   i)] :
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Therefore, in period 6 (production), the e¢ cient production decision is qi = 1 ifEx;v [vj sgii ; p] 
p+ ci   i: The maximized expected gross surplus in period 6 is then
GSi (gi; si) = Ex;v [ (v   ci + i   p) qi (gi; si; p)j sgii ; p] :
Working backwards, in period 5, there are three possible cases of interest. First, if
wi = 0; then the party with the machine may purchase a widget at price p; the party who
owns the machine then gets GSi and the other party obtains a zero payo¤. Second, if
wi = 1 and gi = U; then Ui may keep the widget or sell it into the market at price p; so
she gets GSi + p and Di obtains a zero payo¤. Finally, if wi = 1 and gi = D; then the
parties bargain over whether to transfer the widget from Ui to Di and at what price. Since
Ui can sell the widget on the market at price p; and Di can buy a widget at p; any plausible
bargaining protocol leads to the result that the widget will be traded from Ui to Di at price
p; an illustration of the Law of One Price, so Ui receives p and Di obtains GSi : In sum,
in all three cases, the machine owner receives GSi and the non-owner receives a constant.
These payo¤s determine the partiesinvestment incentives in period 3, as follows.
Let the subscript pair (I; 0) denote the situation in which Di invested and hence is
informed about v but Ui did not invest in cost reduction, (U;) the situation in which Di
did not invest but Ui did, hence reducing production costs by ; and (U; 0) the situation in
which neither invested. Now dene the following:
I;0 = Eci [GS

i (D; si)] if 'i = v; i = 0;
U; = Eci [GS

i (U; si)] if 'i = ;; i = ; and
U;0 = Eci [GS

i (gi; si)] if 'i = ;; i = 0:
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Formally, these expectations are triple integrals over (ci; x; v) space:
I;0 =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p(x;v)
c
(v   p (x; v)  ci) dF (ci; x; v) ;
U; =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z E[vjp] p(x;v)+
c
(v   p (x; v) +   ci) dF (ci; x; v) ; and
U;0 =
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z E[vjp] p(x;v)
c
(v   p (x; v)  ci) dF (ci; x; v) ;
where F is the joint distribution function.
Since one partys expected payo¤ in period 5 is independent of its investment, at most one
party will invest in period 3. If Ui owns the machine (gi = U), she will invest if U; KU 
U;0: Similarly, if Di owns the machine (gi = D); he will invest if I;0   KD  U;0: We
assume that KU and KD are small relative to the benets of investment, so at least one
party will invest.3
To proceed, we need to compute the price function p (x; v) : This involves analyzing the
behavior of other dyads, and it is to this task that we now turn.
4 Rational Expectations in the Market for Intermedi-
ate Goods
Recall that there is a unit mass of dyads indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Who sells on the market and
who buys? Dyads with su¢ ciently low development costs (ci) and no widget may purchase
one, and dyads with a widget and su¢ ciently high development costs may sell one. Dene
cD (v; p) = v   p to be the highest cost at which a downstream party that has invested in
information (and hence knows v) would be prepared to produce a nal good, and similarly
let cU (p) = E [vj p] p+ be the highest cost at which an upstream party that has invested
3This condition can be stated in terms of primitives of the model, but since this is the economic assumption
we are making, we state it in this fashion.
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in cost reduction (but not information) would be prepared to produce. Supposing (as we
will endogenize below) that a fraction  of dyads have D ownership (and hence know v),
whereas fraction 1    have U ownership (and hence costs reduced by ), the buyers and
sellers of widgets are then illustrated in the following diagram.
Figure 2: Supply and Demand
Formally, dyad i sells on the market if it receives a widget (which occurs for a mass
y of dyads) and its development costs ci   i are too high to warrant production (i.e.,
Ex;v [vj si; p]   p < ci   i). Similarly, dyad i buys on the market if it does not receive a
widget (which occurs with probability 1   y) and its development costs are su¢ ciently low
(i.e., Ex;v [vj si; p]  p  ci  i). Then, since ex ante investment incentives are identical for
all dyads, supply of widgets is given by
y Pr [Ex;v [vj si; p (x; v) = p]  p < ci   i]
= y
264 Pr [v   p < ci]
+ (1  ) Pr [E [vj p (x; v) = p]  p < ci  ]
375
= y

1  v   p  c
c  c   (1  )
E [vj p (x; v) = p] +   p  c
c  c

;
and demand for widgets is given by
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(1  y) Pr [ci   i  Ex;v [vj si; p (x; v) = p]  p]
= (1  y) [Pr [ci  v   p] + (1  ) Pr [ci    E [vj p (x; v) = p]  p]]
= (1  y)


v   p  c
c  c + (1  )
E [vj p (x; v) = p] +   p  c
c  c

from inside the industry as well as z from the outside industry. The market-clearing price
equates demand and supply, so substituting x = y   v yields
p = (1  )E [vj p (x; v) = p] + v   (c  c)x+ (1  )  c:
The conditional expectation of v given p therefore must satisfy
E [vj p (; ) = p]  p+ (c  c)x+ c  (1  )  v
1   ; (1)
where the equivalence relation reminds us that (1) must hold as an identity in x and v:
Denition 1 Assume fractions I; I0; U; U0 of dyads are, respectively, informed and
have cost reduction, informed and do not have cost reduction, uninformed and have cost
reduction, and uninformed and do not have cost reduction. Let  = (I; I0; U; U0). A
rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a price function p (x; v) and a production
allocation fqigi2[0;1] such that
1. qi = qi (qi; si; p) for all i; and
2. The market for widgets clears for each (x; v) 2 [x; x] [v; v]:
The above analysis implies I = 0; and KU and KD small implies U0 = 0. Let  = I0
and 1  = U: The problem of nding a rational-expectations price function in this model
becomes one of nding a xed point of (1). In GHP, we solve for this xed point, nding it
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to be piecewise-linear over three regions of (x; v) space: a low-price region, a moderate-price
region, and a high-price region.
Proposition 1 Given ; there exists an REE characterized by a price function
p (x; v) = 1f(x;v)2R1gp
1 (x; v) + 1f(x;v)2R2gp
3 (x; v) + 1f(x;v)2R3gp
3 (x; v) ;
where pj (x; v) = j0 + 
j
1x+ 
j
2v for j = 1; 2; 3:
To build some intuition for this result, consider the gure below, which shows the three
regions of (x; v) space, Rj for j = 1; 2; 3: The low-price region R
1
 begins from the lowest
feasible price, pL at (x; v) ; and extends up to the price p at (x; v) : The moderate-price
region R2 then extends from price p up to the price p at (x; v) ; and the high-price region
R3 extends from p up to the highest feasible price, pH at (x; v) :
Figure 3: Regions of Piecewise-Linear Pricing Function
Within each region, the iso-price loci are linear. In particular, solving pj (x; v) = p for v
yields
v =  
1
j
2j
x+
p  0j
2j
as an iso-price line in (x; v) space. Because x and v are independent and uniform, every (x; v)
point on this line is equally likely. Thus, after observing p; an informed party projects this
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line onto the v-axis and concludes that the conditional distribution of v given p is uniform,
with support depending on which region p is in. For example, if p < p then the lower bound
on v is v and the upper bound is some v (p) < v: Alternatively, if p < p < p then the lower
and upper bounds on v are v and v; so p is uninformative. Finally, if p > p then the lower
bound is some v (p) > v and the upper bound is v:
Given this uniform conditional distribution of v given p; the conditional expectation on
the left-hand side of (1) is then the average of these upper and lower bounds on v: The
coe¢ cients j0; 
j
1; and 
j
2 can then be computed by substituting p
j (x; v) for p on both sides
of (1) and equating coe¢ cients on like terms so that (1) holds as an identity.
5 Industry Equilibrium
To recapitulate, Section 3 analyzed the production decision, taking p (; ) as exogenous,
and Section 4 endogenized prices. In this section, we endogenize the governance-structure
choices of each dyad and dene an industry equilibrium as follows.
Denition 2 An industry equilibrium is a set of dyads of mass ; a price function
p (x; v) ; and a production allocation fqigi2[0;1] such that
1. Each dyad optimally chooses gi; with a fraction 
 choosing gi = D;
2. Each party optimally chooses whether or not to invest;
3. qi = qi (qi; si; p) ; and
4. The market for widgets clears for each (x; v) 2 [x; x] [v; v] :
The choice in period 2 is between the two possible governance structures: gi = U or
gi = D: The ex ante expected surpluses from choosing the two governance structures are
TSU () = U () KU ; and
TSD () = I0 () KD.
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In an interior equilibrium, dyads must be indi¤erent between the two governance structures.
Thus our goal is to nd  such that TSU () = TSD () and to characterize how  varies
as we change the parameters of the model. For simplicity we assume that KU = KD =
K: (The case where KU 6= KD is discussed in Section 6.) We therefore seek  such that
I0 (
) = U (
) ;
or equivalently,
I;0 (
)  U;0 () = U; ()  U;0 () : (2)
To keep notation compact, let v = 1p12 (v   v) and x = 1p12 (x  x) : We will make use
of the following fact (which is derived in the appendix).
Fact 1 Assume   (c  c) x
v
. Then
I;0 ()  U;0 () = 1
2
2v
c  c

1  1
2

c  c
v
x

and
U; ()  U;0 () = 
2
c  c 
1
2
2
c  c + x:
Observe that the rst expression is decreasing in  and the second is increasing in :
This leads to the following characterization of industry equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Assume (c  c) x
v
 1. For all c; c; x; v; > 0 with c  ; there exists
an industry equilibrium. Further,
 =
2v +
2   2 (c  c)x
2v
2
v=x
c c + 2
2
(3)
if the right-hand side of (3) is in [0; 1]. If the right-hand side of (3) is less than 0, then
 = 0; if it is greater than 1, then  = 1.
Proof. If 2v  2 (c  c)x 2; then U;0 (0)  U; (0) and thus, since the left hand side
is decreasing in , it follows that  = 0. Similarly, if 2v

1  1
2
1
c c
v
x

 2 (c  c)x+2,
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then U;0 (1)  U; (1), and since the right hand side is increasing in , we must have that
 = 1. Otherwise, we want to nd  such that
0 =
 
TSU   TSD ()
=
2v +
2   2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c)  

2 (c  c)

v=x
c  c
2v
2
+ 22

;
which yields the expression in the statement of the proposition.
Proposition 2 is our main result, establishing that there exists a unique industry equilib-
rium and providing an explicit expression for the proportion of dyads who choose each of the
governance structures. As the proposition makes clear, this proportion may well be interior.
Recall, however, that our dyads are homogeneous ex ante, so a PRT analysis (taking each
dyad in isolation) would prescribe that they all choose the same governance structure. In
this sense, the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce heterogeneous behaviors
from homogenous dyads. To put this point di¤erently, in this model, the price mechanism
can be seen as endogenizing the parameters of the PRT model so that dyads are indi¤erent
between governance structures. In a richer model, with heterogeneous investment costs,
almost every dyad would have strict preferences between governance structures, with only
the marginal dyad being indi¤erent.
We are also able to perform some comparative statics. First, when the ex ante level of
fundamental uncertainty increases (i.e., v is higher), the return to investing in acquiring
information increases, so  increases to the point where the price mechanism has become
su¢ ciently informative to counteract the increase in v: Second, an increase in noise (i.e., x
is higher) has an identical e¤ect. Finally, an increase in  has two e¤ects. The rst is the
partial-equilibrium channel through which an increase in the benets of choosing upstream
ownership (and hence investing in cost reduction) makes upstream ownership relatively more
appealing, reducing . In an industry equilibrium, however, there is also a price e¤ect. For
a xed fraction 1  of parties that invest in cost reduction, an increase in  makes widgets
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more valuable, which in turn increases demand and hence average prices. Since dyads with
upstream ownership purchase widgets over a larger region of the ci space than do dyads with
downstream ownership, the former face this increase in average price level relatively more
than do dyads with downstream ownership, so the price e¤ect militates towards an increase
in : Which of these two e¤ects dominates depends on the parameters of the model.
Proposition 3 Assume (c  c) x
v
 1. For all c; c; x; v; > 0 with c   and  2
(0; 1) ; we have that: (i)  is increasing in v; (ii) 
 is increasing in x; (iii) 
 is decreasing
in x; and (iv) if  < (c  c)x, then  is decreasing in ; otherwise there exists a ^v
satisfying 0  ^v  2(c c)x3+(c c)x such that 
 is decreasing in  whenever v > ^v and
increasing in  whenever v < ^v:
Proof. See appendix.
6 Implications
6.1 PRT Meets REE
Property-rights theory emphasizes the importance of specic investments for the choice of
governance structure: whichever partys investment is more important should own the rel-
evant asset. We can mimic the PRT by eliminating the role of the price mechanism in
our model, by supposing that a dyad believes p (x; v)  p for all ; x; v and hence does not
recognize that prices are informative.
Fact 2 If p (x; v)  p for all ; x; v then the benets from choosing gi = U are given by
U;0   U;0 = 1
2
2v
c  c;
and the benets from choosing gi = D are
U;   U;0 = 1
2
2 + 2 (v   p  c)
c  c :
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The dyad therefore chooses downstream ownership if 2v > 
2+2 (v   p  c); chooses
upstream ownership if this inequality is reversed, and is indi¤erent if the inequality is re-
placed with an equality. Generically, one of these two inequalities must hold, so the PRT
prescription will be either that all dyads are integrated or that all dyads are non-integrated
(because the dyads are identical ex ante).
In our model, however, the informativeness of the price mechanism endogenizes the re-
turns to specic investments. In particular, dyads that would have chosen to invest in
information acquisition (by choosing downstream ownership of the machine) under the as-
sumptions of Fact 2 may now free-ride on the information contained in the market price and
choose instead to invest in cost reduction (by choosing to have upstream ownership of the
machine). More specically, as we began to explain after Proposition 2, the equilibrium
fraction of dyads choosing downstream ownership in our model,  in (3), is often interior,
not zero or one, as is generally true in a PRT analysis.
Figure 3 illustrates the di¤erence between our analysis and PRT by plotting PRT versus
our  from Proposition 2. To plot this gure, we x = 1=4; c c = 1; and x = 0:8; so that
a PRT analysis predicts that all dyads will choose downstream ownership (i.e., PRT = 1) if
2v > 0:3375; all dyads will choose upstream ownership (

PRT = 0) when 
2
v < 0:3375; and
dyads will be indi¤erent (PRT 2 [0; 1]) when 2v = 0:3375: The gure shows our equilibrium
 as a function of 2v for three di¤erent values of x (namely, 1=10; 1; and 10; with 
 falling
with x for a xed 2v). Our equilibrium converges to 
 = 1 more slowly (and especially
slowly for lower values of x).
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Figure 4: Comparison with PRT
Nonetheless, this observation suggests that empirical tests of PRT that focus solely on
the importance of specic investments may be misleading, by failing to consider the role
that the price mechanism plays in endogenizing the returns to specic investments. Of
course, rms may well not be ex ante identical, and thus a mixture of these two e¤ects may
determine the choice of governance structure.
6.2 TCE Meets REE
Explicitly commenting on Hayeks (1945) discussion of the price mechanism, Williamson
(1975: 5) argues that prices often do not qualify as su¢ cient statistics and that a substitu-
tion of internal organization (hierarchy) for market-mediated exchange often occurs on this
account.
Our model allows us to assess those observations, if we can be precise about two things:
(i) what is means for prices not to qualify as su¢ cient statistics, and (ii) what is meant
by market-mediated exchange. A natural way to think about the rst of these is the
following.
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Denition 3 The equilibrium informativeness of the price system is the expected
reduction in variance Ex;v
h
2v   2vjp
i
that is obtained by conditioning on prices.
In our model, the informativeness of the price system is given by
E

2v   2vjp

= 
2v
2
v=x
c  c :
Naturally, this informativeness is increasing in the fraction of dyads that become informed, :
And in our model market intermediationalso has a natural interpretation: it means relying
on information about v from the price mechanism, rather than acquiring it directly (i.e.,
upstream ownership rather than downstream). In these terms, Williamsons observation
can be stated as: when E
h
2v   2vjp
i
falls,  increases.
In our model, the direct e¤ect of  runs contrary toWilliamsons observation: E
h
2v   2vjp
i
increases with : But, of course,  is endogenous, so it matters what causes  to increase
and what other e¤ects that underlying change has on E
h
2v   2vjp
i
: For example, if x in-
creases then it can be shown that informativeness decreases and  increases, as Williamson
conjectured. On the other hand, many other changes in exogenous variables can lead simul-
taneously to an increases in informativeness and an increase in : That is, it is possible
for the price system to work better at the same time be used less. For example, it is
straightforward to see that an increase in x decreases 
 and decreases informativeness.
And an increase in c  c can do likewise, as reported in the following result.
Proposition 4 Assume (c  c) x
v
 1 and  2 (0; 1). Dene ! = 1
c c . If
1
2
2v
2
v
x
!
2v
2
v
x
! +2
2v +
2
2 (c  c) < x <
2v +
2
2 (c  c) ;
then
@Ex;v[2v 2vjp]
@!
> 0 and @

@!
> 0:
Proof. See appendix.
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6.3 REE Meets PRT
A nal observation is that the theory of the rm sheds new light on the functioning of
the price mechanism. Partially-revealing REE models compare the benets of acquiring
information to the exogenously specied costs of acquiring information. As our model
shows, what matters is not only these exogenous costs KD; but also the opportunity cost of
choosing a governance structure that provides incentives to invest in information (namely,
the foregone opportunity for cost reduction). To analyze this issue, consider the expression
for  when KU 6= KD:
 =
2v +
2   2 (c  c) (x+KD  KU)
2v
2
v=x
c c + 2
2
:
Note the presence of production parameters, such as  and KU ; which have nothing per se
to do with market clearing or price formation. More importantly, note that comparative
statics regarding the informativeness of the price mechanism, such as @=@KD; can depend
on production parameters such as :
In addition to comparative statics that illustrate the potential e¤ects of production pa-
rameters on rational-expectations equilibrium, we can also say something about how the
production environment a¤ects markets. For example, in GHP we showed that (as in
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) market thickness depends on ; with concomitant implica-
tions for economic e¢ ciency and welfare. In this paper, therefore, market thickness depends
on production parameters such as  and KU :
7 Conclusion
Transaction-cost economics and the property-rights theory have made major contributions
to our understanding of why some economic activity occurs within rms. For almost four
decades, however, these theories of rmsboundaries have emphasized the hold-up costs of
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non-integration (at the transaction level), rather than the functioning of the price mechanism
(at the market level).
Motivated by Robertson (1928) and Coase (1937), we view rms and the market not only
as alternative ways of organizing economic activity, but also as institutions that interact and
shape each other. In particular, by combining features of the property-rights theory of rms
boundaries and the rational-expectations theory of the price mechanism, we have developed a
model that incorporates two, reciprocal considerations. First, rms operate in the context of
the market (specically, the informativeness of the price mechanism a¤ects partiesoptimal
governance structures). And second, the market for an intermediate good is made up of
rms (specically, partiesgovernance structures a¤ect how they buy and sell in this market
and hence the informativeness of the price mechanism).
To develop and analyze our model, we have imposed several strong assumptions that
might be relaxed in future work. For example, to eliminate the market for machines, we
assumed that machines are dyad-specic. Also, as in our paper on price formation (where
we analyze individual investors instead of dyads), we ignore the possibility of strategic in-
formation transmission before or during the price-formation process.
In addition to relaxing our current assumptions, it would also be interesting to expand
this line of argument beyond our current application (to rmsboundaries). For example,
a host of internal organizational structures and processes seem likely to be inuenced by
the information available from the price mechanism (including transfer pricing, resource
allocation, and empowerment), but our elemental property-rights model of a dyad is too
simple to address these internal issues. Also, as well as investigating the impact of the
market on rms, there may be more to say about the impact of rms on the market. For
example, it would be interesting to know whether the equilibrium informativeness of the price
mechanism is socially e¢ cient and (assuming it is not) what features of rmsproduction
environment facilitate better performance by the market.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Derivation of Fact 1
Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()]  Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()] =
1
2
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
 
v2   2vjp

dxdv
=
1
2
Ex;v
h
2vjp
i
c  c =
1
2
2v
c  c

1  
2
v=x
c  c

;
which is continuous and strictly decreasing in  and similarly,
Ex;v;ci [U; ()]  Ex;v;ci [U;0 ()] =
2
2 (c  c) + 
Ex;v

vjp (x; v)
  c  Ex;v [p (x; v)]
(c  c)
=
2
c  c 
2
2 (c  c) + x;
which is continuous and strictly increasing in . For the last equalities in these two
expressions, we use the following three facts:
Ex;v

vjp

= v;
Ex;v

2vjp

= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c  c

; and
Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  x (c  c)  c;
which we now prove. First note that when   (c  c) x
v
, p (x; v) =
P3
j=1 1f(x;v)2Rjgp
j
 (x; v),
28
where
p1 (x; v) = (1  )
v + ((c  c) =) x
2
+ (1  )  c+ 1 + 
2
v   1 + 
2
c  c

x
p2 (x; v) = (1  )
v + v
2
+ (1  )  c+ v   (c  c)x
p3 (x; v) = (1  )
((c  c) =)x+ v
2
+ (1  )  c+ 1 + 
2
v   1 + 
2
c  c

x;
and
R1 =

(x; v) : p1 (x; v)  p1 (x; v)
	
R2 =

(x; v) : p2 (x; v) < p
2
 (x; v)  p2 (x; v)
	
R3 =

(x; v) : p3 (x; v) < p
3
 (x; v)
	
.
We can rewrite the prices as
p1 (x; v) = p
2
 (x; v) 
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

p2 (x; v) = (1  )
v + v
2
+ (1  )  c+ v   (c  c)x
p3 (x; v) = p
2
 (x; v) +
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

:
For simplicity of notation, dene Rj (v) =

x : (x; v) 2 Rj
	
. That is
R1 (v) =

x  
c  c (v   v) ; x

R2 (v) =

x+

c  c (v   v) ; x 

c  c (v   v)

R3 (v) =

x; x+

c  c (v   v)

:
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Finally, note that
1vjp (x; v) = v  
1
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

2vjp (x; v) = v
3vjp (x; v) = v +
1
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

:
Claim 1 Ex;v

vjp

= v
Proof. Follows directly from the Law of Iterated Expectations.
Claim 2 Ex;v
h
2vjp
i
= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c c

Proof. Here, we want to compute
Ex;v

2vjp

=
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)

v2    1vjp2 dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x  
c c (v v)
x+ 
c c (v v)
 
v2   (v)2

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x

v2    3vjp2 dxdv
If we substitute and rearrange, this becomes
Ex;v

2vjp

=
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
 
v2   (v)2

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
 
v

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

  1
4

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)
2!
dxdv
  1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
 
v

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

+
1
4

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)
2!
dxdv
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Integrating, we get
Ex;v

2vjp

= 2v +
v
x

c  c

v
(v   v)
6
  1
4
2v

  v
x

c  c

v
(v   v)
6
+
1
4
2v

= 2v

1  
2
v=x
c  c

;
which was the original claim.
Claim 3 Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  x (c  c)  c
Proof. Similarly as above,
Ex;v [p (x; v)] =
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
p1 (x; v) dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x  
c c (v v)
x+ 
c c (v v)
p2 (x; v) dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
p3 (x; v) dxdv:
If we substitute and rearrange, we get
Ex;v [p (x; v)] =
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
p2 (x; v) dxdv
  1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x  
c c (v v)
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

dxdv
+
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x+ 
c c (v v)
x
1  
2

(v   v)  c  c

(x  x)

dxdv
or since the last two expressions are equal but with opposite signs,
Ex;v [p (x; v)] = v + (1  )  (c  c)x   c;
which is the desired expression
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8.2 Derivation of Fact 2
Explicit computation yields the following benet for choosing g = U
E [U;0]  E [U;0] = 1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
  1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
=
1
2
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
(v   v)2 dxdv
=
1
2
2v
c  c;
and similarly the benets for choosing g = D are
E [U;]  E [U;0] = 1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p+
c
(v   p+  ci) dcidxdv
  1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x
Z v p
c
(v   p  ci) dcidxdv
=
1
c  c
1
v   v
1
x  x
Z v
v
Z x
x

(v   p)  c+ 
2
2

dxdv
=
1
2
2 + 2 (v   p  c)
c  c :
8.3 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3. To establish that  is increasing in v, note that at  = 0, the
gains from choosing integration (and hence becoming informed) instead of non-integration
(and hence enjoying a cost reduction) are given by
 
TSU   TSD ( = 0) = 2v +2   2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c)
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and at  = 1; the gains from choosing integration over non-integration are
 
TSU   TSD ( = 1) = 2v
2 (c  c)

1  1
2
v=x
c  c

  
2 + 2 (c  c)x
2 (c  c) :
Since we are at an interior solution,
 
TSU   TSD ( = 0) > 0 and  TSU   TSD ( = 1) <
0. Next, note that
 
TSU   TSD ( = 0) is increasing in v and  TSU   TSD ( = 1) is
increasing in v if (c  c) xv > 34 , which is true since (c  c) xv > 1. Since
 
TSU   TSD ()
is linear in , this then implies that  is increasing in v.
The comparative statics with respect to x and x are straightforward. Finally, note
that
@
@
= 2
  (c  c)x   2
v=x
c c
2v
2
+ 22
:
When  < (c  c)x, this is clearly negative. Otherwise, if , note that at v = 0,
2 =   2 (c  c)x, so this expression is positive. For v > 2(c c)x3+(c c)x , the expression
is negative. Since  is increasing in v, this implies that there is a cuto¤ value 0  ^v 
2(c c)x
3+(c c)x , a function of the other parameters of the model, for which v < ^v implies that
@
@
> 0 and v > ^v implies that @

@
< 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that
@
@!
=
2! 2x  
2
v
2
v
x

2v
2
v
x
! + 22
> 0
whenever
1
2
2v
2
v
x
!
2v
2
v
x
! +2
2v +
2
2! 1
< x <
2v +
2
2! 1
;
and
@Ex;v
h
2v   2vjp
i
@!
=
2v
2
v
x
 
22
2v
2
v
x
! + 22
 +
2! 1x
2v
2
v
x
! + 22
!
> 0;
so that equilibrium informativeness is always increasing in !:
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